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How does labour market structure affect  
the response of economies to shocks? 
 
Aurelijus Dabušinskas - István Kónya - Stephen Millard 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The recent crisis in the Eurozone has led to much discussion about the structure of labour 
markets in different Eurozone economies.  In particular, there has been much talk of the need 
for structural labour market reform in the Eurozone periphery. But, there are many aspects 
of labour market structure – eg, wage flexibility, flexibility in hiring and firing, benefits, etc – 
and it is not clear a priori which aspects really matter. In this paper, we analyse how cross-
country differences in labour market characteristics – in particular, wage and employment 
rigidities – shape the response of different countries to a variety of macroeconomic shocks. 
To address this question, we use a calibrated small open economy model in which we set the 
parameters governing the structural characteristics of the labour market based on three 
European countries: Estonia, Finland and Spain. We found that, given our labour market 
calibrations, we would expect output and unemployment to be much more adversely affected 
by the shocks associated with the financial crisis in countries with high unemployment 
benefit replacement ratios and high job turnover rates. 
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Miként befolyásolja a munkapiac felépítése  
a gazdaság alkalmazkodását exogén sokkokhoz? 
 
Aurelijus Dabušinskas - Kónya István - Stephen Millard 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Az eurozóna közelmúltbeli válsága kapcsán jelentős hangsúlyt kaptak a tagországok 
különböző munkapiaci intézményei. Ezen belül is különösen fontos kérdés a munkapiac 
strukturális reformja az eurozóna perifériájának országaiban. A munkapiac felépítésének 
azonban számos jellemzője van – a bérek, illetve a felvételek és elbocsátások rugalmassága, a 
jóléti juttatások stb. – és előzetesen nem világos, hogy mely aspektusok a legfontosabbak. 
Ebben a tanulmányban azt vizsgáljuk, hogy a munkapiac felépítésének országok közötti 
eltérései – különösen a bérek és a foglalkoztatás merevségei – miként befolyásolják az 
országok különböző sokkokra történő alkalmazkodását. E kérdés megválaszolásához egy 
kalibrált, kis nyitott gazdaságos modellt használunk, amelyben a munkapiac intézményi 
felépítését vezérlő paramétereket három európai ország munkapiaca alapján állítjuk be: ezek 
Észtország, Finnország és Spanyolország. Fő eredményeink azt mutatják, hogy a pénzügyi 
válságot kísérő sokkok hatása a kibocsátásra és a foglalkoztatásra sokkal negatívabb azokban 
az országokban, ahol magas a munkanélküli juttatások bérekhez viszonyított aránya, illetve 
ahol nagyok a munkapiaci áramlások. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: munkapiaci intézmények, munkapiaci rugalmasság 
 
 
JEL kód: E24 
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SUMMARY 
 
Since the financial crisis started in 2007, euro-area countries have experienced extremely 
divergent paths for economic growth, inflation and unemployment.  Many economists have 
suggested that these divergent experiences can be put down to differences in the flexibility of 
the labour market in these different countries.  In particular, it has often been argued that the 
financial crisis has brought to the forefront the need for labour market reforms in those 
countries that have performed badly.  But, there are many aspects of labour market structure 
– eg, wage flexibility, flexibility in hiring and firing, benefits, etc – and it is not clear a priori 
which aspects really matter.  In this paper, we analyse how cross-country differences in 
labour market characteristics – in particular, wage and employment rigidities – shape the 
response of different countries to a variety of macroeconomic shocks. 
Much work has been done of late examining wage and employment dynamics in 
European countries.  Some key findings of this research are that there is marked 
heterogeneity in labour market institutions across countries;  that wages are reset less 
frequently than prices in a way that is both time-dependent and highly synchronised;  that 
changes in base wages are linked to inflation but firms used other margins to adjust their 
wage bill;  that real wages are marginally procyclical in most countries;  that the wages of new 
hires tend to be linked to internal pay scales (ie, the wages of existing workers);  that wages 
are downwardly rigid but whether this is real or nominal rigidity depends on the country;  
and that wages only partially feed through into inflation with the degree of passthrough 
depending on the degree of product market competition and the labour share.  An important 
motivation for this paper was the need to assess the implications of these results for how 
different European economies might be expected to respond to macroeconomic shocks. 
In our analysis, we are interested in answering the question of how might we expect 
nominal and real wage growth, employment and unemployment, output and inflation 
respond to financial intermediation, fiscal and external demand shocks in these different 
countries and how these responses are affected by differences in the countries’ labour 
markets.  In particular, would we expect real wages to be responding in a pro or 
countercyclical manner to the shocks and would we expect this to vary across different 
countries?  To what degree might we expect the responses of wages and employment to vary 
across countries whose labour markets exhibit different degrees of wage and employment 
flexibility?  To what extent do we expect changes in wages to feed through into relative prices 
and competitiveness? 
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To answer these question, we use a calibrated macroeconomic model but adjust the 
parameters governing labour market structure in line with a number of Eurozone countries, 
where the chosen countries reflect labour markets that are more or less flexible in different 
dimensions.  To be more precise we consider Estonia, Finland and Spain.  We chose only 
Eurozone countries so as to avoid any issues around exchange rate movements and we chose 
these three particular countries because they reflect a variety of stages of economic 
development, a variety of unemployment rate responses to the financial crisis, and a variety 
of labour market features.  The unemployment rate in Finland rose only a little in response to 
the crisis whereas the unemployment rate in Spain and Estonia rose markedly in response, 
since when the Spanish unemployment rate has stayed high while Estonia’s has fallen back to 
its pre-crisis rate.  The structural differences that we captured in our calibration included the 
job destruction and job finding rates and unemployment benefit replacement ratios. The 
relative rigidity of the Spanish labour market is reflected in its rather low job finding rate and 
high average unemployment rate whereas the Finnish and Estonian labour markets feature 
even higher job finding rates but have dramatically different income replacement ratios.  
Once we bring in our calibration of wage stickiness for existing and new employees, as well as 
wage indexation, categorising our labour markets as more or less flexible becomes more 
difficult.  Nominal wages are fairly rigid in all our countries, with wages reset about once a 
year in all countries.  Wage indexation is high in Finland and Spain but in terms of the extent 
to which (real) wages of newly hired employees are related to the wages of existing 
employees, and the bargaining power of workers more generally, Estonia emerges as more 
‘flexible’ than the other countries. 
We found that, given our labour market calibrations, we would expect output and 
unemployment to be much more adversely affected by the shocks associated with the 
financial crisis in Finland than in the other two countries.  In terms of real wages, on the 
other hand, we would expect Spain and Estonia to be more adversely affected.  These results 
are driven by the high unemployment benefit replacement ratio in Finland, the high job 
turnover in Finland and Estonia and the low worker bargaining power in Estonia. 
Of course, in reality the Spanish economy was much more adversely affected by the 
financial crisis than the Finnish economy.  Unemployment rose significantly in Estonia but 
quickly fell back again.  This is likely to reflect the fact that the shocks affecting these 
economies were markedly different in this period, with the effect of the financial shock on 
Spanish risk premia – as picked up in the spread of Spanish bonds over German bunds – 
being much larger than in the other countries, and necessitating a protracted period of fiscal 
consolidation that the model would pick up as a series of large negative government spending 
shocks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
Since the financial crisis started in 2007, euro-area countries have experienced extremely 
divergent paths for economic growth, inflation and unemployment.  Chart 1 illustrates this by 
plotting the unemployment rate in three different euro-area economies together with the 
unemployment rate for the Euro Area as a whole.  Many economists have suggested that 
these divergent experiences can be put down to differences in the flexibility of the labour 
market in these different countries.  In particular, it has often been argued that the financial 
crisis has brought to the forefront the need for labour market reforms in those countries that 
have performed badly.  But, there are many aspects of labour market structure – eg, wage 
flexibility, flexibility in hiring and firing, benefits, etc – and it is not clear a priori which 
aspects really matter.  In this paper, we analyse how cross-country differences in labour 
market characteristics – in particular, wage and employment rigidities – shape the response 
of different countries to a variety of macroeconomic shocks. 
 
 
 
Much work has been done of late examining wage and employment dynamics in 
European countries.  In particular, the Eurosystem’s ‘Wage Dynamics Network’ (WDN) has 
carried out a survey of wage and price setting in 17 European countries, both inside and 
outside the Euro Area.1  Using data from this survey, Druant et al. (2010) examined the link 
between wage and price setting, Babecky et al. (2010) examined downward wage rigidity, 
Bertola et al. (2010) examined how wages and employment respond to shocks, and Galuscak 
et al. (2010) examined how the wages of newly-hired workers are determined.  In addition, 
WDN researchers have sought to use recently available microeconomic data collected in 
                                                        
1 See Druant et al. (2010) for a detailed description of the survey. 
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different European countries to assess differences in labour markets across these countries.2  
Some key findings of the WDN were that there is marked heterogeneity in labour market 
institutions across countries;  that wages are reset less frequently than prices in a way that is 
both time-dependent and highly synchronised;  that changes in base wages are linked to 
inflation but firms used other margins to adjust their wage bill;  that real wages are 
marginally procyclical in most countries;  that the wages of new hires tend to be linked to 
internal pay scales (ie, the wages of existing workers);  that wages are downwardly rigid but 
whether this is real or nominal rigidity depends on the country;  and that wages only partially 
feed through into inflation with the degree of passthrough depending on the degree of 
product market competition and the labour share.  An important motivation for this paper 
was the need to assess the implications of these results for how different European economies 
might be expected to respond to macroeconomic shocks. 
To answer this question, we use a calibrated macroeconomic model – that of Jakab and 
Konya (2009) – but adjust the parameters governing labour market structure in line with a 
number of Eurozone countries, where the chosen countries reflect labour markets that are 
more or less flexible in different dimensions.  To be more precise we consider Estonia, 
Finland and Spain.  We chose only Eurozone countries so as to avoid any issues around 
exchange rate movements and we chose these three particular countries because they reflect 
a variety of stages of economic development, a variety of unemployment rate responses to the 
financial crisis, and a variety of labour market features.  In particular, as Chart 1 shows, the 
unemployment rate in Finland rose only a little in response to the crisis whereas the 
unemployment rate in Spain and Estonia rose markedly in response, since when the Spanish 
unemployment rate has stayed high while Estonia’s has fallen back to its pre-crisis rate.  In 
terms of structural features of the labour market, we can note that Spain’s labour market is 
not particularly flexible whereas the labour markets of Estonia and Finland are fairly flexible.  
Spain and Finland both exhibit a large degree of downward real wage rigidity whereas wages 
in Estonia are flexible. 
In our analysis, we are interested in answering the question of how might we expect 
nominal and real wage growth, employment and unemployment, output and inflation 
respond to financial intermediation, fiscal and external demand shocks in these different 
countries and how these responses are affected by differences in the countries’ labour 
markets.  In particular, would we expect real wages to be responding in a pro or 
countercyclical manner to the shocks and would we expect this to vary across different 
countries?  To what degree might we expect the responses of wages and employment to vary 
                                                        
2 For example, du Caju et al. (2010a) examined differences in downward real and nominal wage 
rigidity across countries and du Caju et al. (2010b) examined inter-industry wage differentials in 
different EU countries. 
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across countries whose labour markets exhibit different degrees of wage and employment 
flexibility?  To what extent do we expect changes in wages to feed through into relative prices 
and competitiveness? 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  In the next section, we develop the model we are 
going to use to analyse the effects of these shocks before discussing the labour markets of the 
three countries we examine in Section 3.  Section 4 discusses the calibration of the model, in 
particular, concentrating on the parameters governing the labour market in the different 
economies.  Section 5 examines how we might expect the different economies to respond to 
financial, fiscal and foreign demand shocks.  Section 6 illustrates how these responses 
depend on labour market structure and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
In this section, we describe the open-economy model we are going to use.  The model we use 
was developed in Jakab and Konya (2009).  It is a small open economy model with search 
and matching in the labour market.  Demand for the economy’s exports will depend on their 
relative price and an exogenous foreign demand shock.  Import prices are taken as given.  
Given that we are interested in Eurozone countries, we assume that import and export prices 
are denoted in the same currency and that interest rates are exogenous.  
2.1 HOUSEHOLDS 
The representative household maximizes their intertemporal utility by selecting streams of 
consumption, investment and domestic bond holdings.  Consumption is subject to external 
habits, and investment is subject to adjustment costs. Household members are either 
employed or unemployed, but are able to fully insure each other against the random 
fluctuation of employment.  This implies that the representative household member's utility 
function includes the average disutility of labour, .  We defer detailed discussion of the 
labour market to later. 
The representative households' problem can be written as  
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where tc  is consumption, 1tc  is average consumption in the previous period, tn and tu  are 
the employment and unemployment rates, respectively, ti  is investment, thb ,  is the level of 
risky nominal bonds held by the household, Rt is the risk-free nominal interest rate, tp  is the 
consumer price index,  is a lump-sum tax that ensures that the government’s budget is 
balanced in steady state with a zero net supply of bonds, tw  is the real wage rate, 
k
tr  is the 
(real) rental rate on capital, 1tK  is the capital stock carried over from the previous period, zt 
represents the intensity with which the capital stock is used in period t, and td  is lump sum 
net income from other sources such as dividends and government transfers.  We assume that 
the investment cost function is non-negative, and has the property that     011   and 
we let     1 . 
We add a shock that drives a wedge between the central bank interest rate and the 
interest rate households face, as in Smets and Wouters (2007); that is, the gross return on 
risky bonds held by consumers will equal tRe
d
t . We think of this as capturing the shock to the 
ability of the financial system to intermediate between lenders and borrowers, resulting from 
the sub-prime crisis. Many recent models explicitly incorporate financial frictions into DSGE 
models, using mostly variants of the Bernanke et al. (1999) financial accelerator mechanism.3  
Since our purpose here is not to explain what caused the crisis, we treat the increase in 
financial frictions as exogenous. Also, since we estimate the interest rate wedge, our approach 
can be thought of as a reduced form for many different explanations of financial frictions. 
Our goal is simply to explore the consequences of an increase of the interest rate spread on 
the real economy, so we do not need to take a stand on the particular mechanism that caused 
the increase. For a similar approach looking at the US economy, see Hall (2009). 
The first-order conditions for this problem (leaving aside labour supply for now) will be 
given by: 
 
                                                        
3 See, eg, Christiano et al. (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2010). 
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The first equation defines the marginal utility of income, t , the second equation is the 
household Euler equation, the third equation describes investment behaviour, the fourth 
equation is an arbitrage condition between investment into bonds and capital that defines the 
shadow value of capital, the fifth equation determines capital utilisation and the final 
equation defines the dynamic behaviour of capital. 
2.2 JOB FLOWS 
As is typical in the literature, we assume that new jobs are created when unemployed workers 
meet open job vacancies.  The number of matches is described by a constant-returns-to-scale, 
Cobb-Douglas, matching function: 
 
 
  1ttmt uvm  (3) 
 
where tm  is the number of new matches, tv  is the number of open vacancies, and tu  is the 
number of unemployed.  We follow the timing convention of Gertler et al. (2008) and assume 
that employment tn  evolves according to the flow equation: 
 
   ,1 1 ttt mnn    (4) 
 
where   is the exogenous separation rate and in which matches become productive 
immediately. 
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We normalize the labor force to unity. Then unemployment will be given by 
 
 .1 1 tt nu  (5) 
 
Thus workers who lose their jobs have to wait one period to be able to search for a new 
one, but those who enter the workforce can search immediately.  Finally, we can define the 
job filling rate by ttt vmq / , the job finding rate by ttt ums /  and labour market tightness by 
ttt uv / . 
2.3 THE WHOLESALE SECTOR 
Firms within the wholesale sector produce a homogenous product, using capital, imported 
intermediates and labour.  Capital and imported intermediates are acquired at competitive 
factor markets at factor prices ktr  and 
m
tp .  The return on capital will be determined by 
market clearing in the domestic capital market whereas we assume that import prices are 
exogenous.  The labour market, on the other hand, is subject to search-and-matching 
frictions.  Each job is a firm-worker pair, subject to an exogenous job destruction probability 
 .  The aggregate production function is given by the following Cobb-Douglas specification: 
 
     ,
11
,
  zz ttmttt NYkzY  (6) 
 
where tY  is the amount of output produced, tk  is the firm’s demand for capital services 
(equal in equilibrium to the aggregate capital stock multiplied by its rate of utilisation), tmY ,  
is imported intermediates, tN  is the number of workers employed, and as defined above, 
tz stands for capacity utilization.  We assume that each firm employs one worker, so we can 
rewrite the production functions in a per-worker form as: 
 
  
   1,
z
tmttt ykzy  (7) 
 
Given the Cobb-Douglas specification and the fact that the capital and import markets are 
competitive, demand for these inputs is given by the familiar conditions: 
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This implies that the flow benefit of a job match for a firm is given by 
 
    .11 , ttwzt yp   (9) 
 
We base our description of the wage setting process on Bodart et al. (2006) and Konya 
and Krause (2008).  In particular, we distinguish between the wage of new hires, and wages 
in existing jobs.  Both wage-setting processes are described by a Calvo (1983) probability.  In 
particular, wages in existing jobs are bargained with a probability w1 ;  otherwise the wage 
is left at last period’s value.  For new hires, the wage is negotiated with probability w1 , 
otherwise it is indexed to last period’s average wage 1tw (we discuss indexation below).  We 
denote wages that are set optimally in period t by 

tw . 
When a wage is not bargained over, it may still be adjusted to inflation. We allow for the 
following rule-of-thumb when wages are not bargained over:  ,1
w
t
t
t
w
w


 where 1/  ttt pp  
is the inflation rate. Notice that since wt  is the real wage, the specification nests full nominal 
( 0w ) and real wage rigidity ( 1w ). 
Let tV  denote the value of a vacancy and let tJ  denote the value of a filled job.4  Since a 
vacancy is filled with probability tq  and the wage bargain takes place with probability  , tV  
is given by 
         ttwttwt
t
t wJwJqV 


11  (10) 
 
We assume the usual free-entry condition in the market for vacancies, which implies that 
the value of vacancies is identically zero,  0tV  . 
Let )( tt wJ  denote the value of a job that was renegotiated at t, and is given by: 
 
           .11 1111   ttwttw
t
t
ttttt wJwJEwwJ 


  (11) 
 
Unemployed workers receive an income ub  while unemployed, and enjoy the monetized 
value of leisure t / .  Thus, the value function for an unemployed worker, tU , can be written 
as: 
                                                        
4 To save on notation, we will not explicitly indicate the indexation of past wages in the value 
functions. We make the indexation explicit whenever it is necessary in the formulas below. 
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The value of a job when the wage is just negotiated is given by: 
 
            .11 11111   tttwttw
t
t
tttt UwWwWEwwW 


  (13) 
 
When wages are negotiated, we assume that they are set as a solution to the generalised 
Nash bargaining problem, as is standard in the literature. 
Thus the wage tw   solves: 
 
      ,max
1   
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where the parameter   measures the bargaining power of workers.  The result of such a wage 
bargain is a wage that splits the combined surplus value of the job to the firm and worker 
between the firm and worker with the workers achieving a share of  and the firms 1-. 
Using again equations (11), (12) and (13), we can rewrite the wage setting condition as 
follows: 
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Thus the wage that is set at time t  is a combination of what it would be without any 
rigidity for existing jobs (the first two terms), and a term that captures the possibility that the 
newly set wage remains effective for some time period. 
Recall that tw  is the wage rate that is bargained at period t .  The evolution of the average 
wage depends both on the newly set wage and on those wages that are not allowed to reset.  
Let tw  denote the economy wide average wage, which evolves according to:  
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Let us define the ‘flexible wage’ as: 
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which would be the wage under continuous Nash bargaining. 
Log-linearising these equations, and noting that in the steady state nm  , leads us to 
the following real wage Phillips curve:  
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As the equation shows, wages are persistent, but real wage inflation is not.  Wage 
persistence, intuitively, depends on three parameters:  the exogenous Calvo (1983) 
probabilities w  and w , and the job destruction rate  . 
We can also derive the job creation condition: 
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(19) 
 
Notice that if there is no wage rigidity for new hires, ie, 0w , the job creation condition 
is identical to the one under continuous Nash bargaining.  This is the point made by 
Pissarides (2009):  for job creation and hence unemployment volatility, only the wages of 
new hires matter. With wage rigidity for new hires, however, job creation responds not only 
to next period’s shocks, but also to the evolution of the average wage. 
2.4 THE RETAIL SECTOR 
The retail sector contains an infinite number of monopolistically competing firms, who buy 
the homogenous wholesale good and differentiate it.  Consumers value the differentiated 
final goods according to the following CES utility function: 
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where )(iyt  is output of a typical variety in sector i,  and   is the desired mark-up.  Demand 
for variety i  is then given by: 
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Price setting follows the basic New Keynesian model, based on Calvo (1983). In each 
period, a retail firm can reset its price optimally with probability p1 .  If it cannot reset its 
price optimally, it partially indexes its price to lagged inflation with the indexation parameter 
denoted by p . As is well known, these assumptions lead to the (log-linearized) New 
Keynesian Phillips curve: 
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where denotes inflation (and we have assumed zero inflation in steady state) and pt
w
 
denotes the log deviation of real marginal cost (the wholesale price) from its steady state 
value, 1/(1+). 
2.5 EQUILIBRIUM 
Retail goods are sold domestically or exported.  The wholesale sector is composed of tn  firms 
producing ty  units of the wholesale good each.  Let tdn ,  denote the number of firms (and 
workers) who serve the domestic retail sector, then domestic final sales are given by ttd yn , .  
These are used for consumption, investment, and government consumption.  The latter is 
assumed to be exogenous and unproductive, described by an autoregressive process.  The 
domestic equilibrium condition is then given by: 
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Government spending is financed by the lump-sum tax and by issuing bonds to 
households and foreigners: 
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As discussed earlier, we assume that these government bonds are risky and denote shocks 
to the risk premium by d.  Such shocks are a short-hand way of capturing the rise in spreads 
resulting from the financial crisis.  And, as we said earlier, we assume that such bonds are in 
zero supply in steady state.  In addition, we assume that the government has to pay an 
additional cost on the debt that is held by foreigners, tffb b ,, .  Given that we set so as to 
ensure the government’s budget is balanced in steady state with a zero net supply of domestic 
bonds, this cost of holding foreign debt ensures that the model is stationary – with a steady-
state net foreign asset position of zero – and also captures the fact that those countries which 
have issued too much debt to foreigners have had severe problems since the financial crisis 
started.   
Monetary policy is assumed to be determined by the ECB and is exogenous to our three 
economies. 
We posit an ad hoc export demand equation with export demand depending on the terms 
of trade and a foreign demand shock. 
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Finally, we can rewrite the household and government budget constraints to get the 
current account: 
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3. STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OUR THREE ECONOMIES 
 
Before going on to discuss the data we use and the estimation itself, we first consider the 
structure and institutions characterising the labour markets of the three economies we 
consider.  We do this because a key interest within this paper is how differences in labour 
market structure and institutions affect how these countries respond to macroeconomic 
shocks.  Table A shows a set of structural indicators for the labour markets of our sample of 
 19 
 
countries.  The table shows a number of labour market characteristics and reveals several 
important structural differences among the considered economies. 
The top of the table shows three indicators that have direct counterparts among our 
model parameters:  the net replacement rates (capturing the extent of unemployment 
benefits), and job finding and destruction rates.  In terms of the generosity of unemployment 
benefits, our countries cover a range of cases, starting from the replacement rate of 52 
percent in Estonia to 71 percent in Finland, whereas in terms of the intensity of labour flows, 
the countries broadly fall into two groups.  The job finding and destruction rates are relatively 
high in Estonia and Finland but notably lower in Spain. 
Our countries also differ with regard to unionisation and centralisation in wage 
bargaining.  In Estonia union coverage is low (up to 35 percent), and wage bargaining is 
largely decentralised (takes place predominantly at the company level).  In contrast, the 
coverage is high (above 80 percent), and wage bargaining is considerably more centralised in 
Finland and Spain, where it typically takes place at the national or regional and then sectoral 
level.  (See Du Caju et al. (2008).)  Interestingly, the average length of collective agreements 
also differs between the two groups:  it is one year in Estonia but two and a half years in 
Finland and Spain.  Of course, it is difficult to translate this evidence into what we might 
think of as ‘bargaining power’ in the model. 
Comparable cross-country information on wage rigidity is scarce. The WDN survey 
evidence on wage setting at the firm level sheds light on the frequency of wage changes and 
indexation of wages to inflation but covers only two of our countries:  Estonia and Spain.  
Concerning the frequency, the middle part of the table shows the percentage of firms that 
change wages more often than once a year and the share of those that do so yearly.  This 
evidence suggests that for Estonia and Spain the model probability of no price change under 
Calvo’s pricing should be about equal to 0.75.  Note however that the implied average 
durations of wages computed by Druant et al. (2010) under the assumption that wage 
durations are distributed log-normally appear rather similar.         
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Table A 
  Structural indicators 
  Estonia Finland Spain 
 Net replacement rate /1 0.52 0.71 0.55 
 Job finding rate /2 0.31 0.40 0.12 
 Job destruction rate /3 0.033 0.037 0.015 
     
U
n
io
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
 Union density /4 Very low Moderate Very low 
Union coverage, % /5 22 90 80 
Principal bargaining level /6 Company National/
sectoral  
Regional
/ 
sectoral 
Average length of collective 
bargaining agreements, years/7 
1 2 ½ 2 ½ 
     
W
a
g
e 
ch
a
n
g
es
 
Frequency of wage changes /8    
- higher than yearly, % of 
firms 
19.9 Na 11.9 
- yearly, % of firms 64.4 Na 84.1 
Implied duration of wages, 
months /9 
12.7 Na 11.9 
    
Institutionalized wage 
indexation /10 
None High High 
Automatic (rule-based) 
indexation, % of firms /11 
4 Na 55 
No rule, but inflation 
considered, % of firms /12 
46 Na 16 
     
W
a
g
e 
ri
g
id
it
y
 Downward wage rigidity /13    
- nominal Na 0.31 0.16 
- real  Na 0.64 0.24 
    
Importance of external labour 
market conditions in hiring pay 
determination, % of firms /14 
32.0 Na 4.4 
     
 Employment protection 
legislation /15  
2.39 2.29 3.11 
     
 Monetary policy regime /16 Currency 
board 
Euro area Euro area 
 Size, GDP, bill. euro (2007)/17 15.8 179.7 1053.5 
 
Notes: 
(1) Estonia: net replacement rate, average over initial and long-term 
unemployment and two income levels (67 and 100 percent of average wage). 
Source: OECD, Benefits and wages: tax-benefit indicators (2007). 
(2) Source: Hobijn and Şahin (2007) for Spain and Finland. The Estonian rate is 
calibrated on the basis of short-term (up to 3 months) and longer-term (more than 
3 months) unemployment duration series over 2000Q-2009Q4, following Shimer 
(2005). 
(3) Computed as steady state unemployment rate * job finding rate / (1- steady 
state unemployment rate). 
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(4) Very low (0-25%), low (26-50%), moderate (51-75%), high (76-100%). Source: 
Du Caju, et al. (2008).  
(5) Source: Venn (2009).  
(6) Source: Du Caju et al. (2008) ; see also Table 1 in Venn (2009). 
(7) Source: Du Caju et al. (2008). 
(8) Source: Druant et al. (2010). 
(9) Estimated under the assumption that wage durations are distributed log-
normally. Source: Druant et al. (2010). 
(10) Percent of covered workers; very low (0-25%), low (26-50%), moderate (51-
75%), high (76-100%). In both Finland and Spain the high degree of indexation is 
implemented through collective agreements. Source: Du Caju et al. (2008). 
(11) Source: Babecký et al. (2010).  
(12) Source: Druant et al. (2010). 
(13) The fraction of workers whose wages were not lowered in nominal (real) terms 
because of downward rigidity relative to the group of workers that might otherwise 
have experienced nominal (real) wage cuts. Source: Dickens et al. (2006) for 
Finland, Messina et al. (2010) for Spain. 
(14) Employment-weighted average share of firms indicating that external market 
conditions (specifically, wages outside the firm and labour supply) are the most 
important factors determining the pay of newly hired employees. Source: Galuščak 
et al. (2010).  
(15) OECD EPL index, ranging from 0 (weakest) to 6 (strictest) regulation. Source: 
Venn (2009). 
(16) CB – currency board, with the euro as anchor currency; EA – euro area; IT – 
inflation targeting.  
(17) Source: Eurostat. 
 
Both the WDN survey and institutional information can be also used to obtain insights on 
the extent and nature of wage indexation.  There is no institutionalised wage indexation in 
Estonia, but Du Caju et al. (2008) suggest that the coverage of indexation implemented 
through collective agreements is high (exceeds 75 percent) in Finland and Spain.  The WDN 
survey evidence on wage indexation at the firm level presented in Babecký et al. (2010) 
corroborates this:  the share of firms practicing automatic (rule-based) wage indexation is 
found to be 4% in Estonia but 55% in Spain.  The survey data also reveal that a relatively 
large proportion of firms in Estonia, 46%, do not practice rule-based indexation but ‘take 
inflation in account’.  Hence, even though the incidence of explicit indexation in these 
countries is low, the overall degree of wage indexation may be higher because of less formal 
firm-level practices by which wages are adjusted to inflation.  All in all, however, the evidence 
suggests that wage indexation – and by implication real wage rigidity – is more prevalent in 
Finland and Spain than in Estonia.  The WDN survey findings about the main determinants 
of wages paid to newly hired employees provide indirect evidence on the relative flexibility of 
such wages across different countries.  In this regard, Galuscak et al. (2010) consider the 
share of firms that indicated that external factors – wages outside the firm or availability of 
workers in the market – are more important in determining the wages of the newly hired 
than factors internal to the firm, such as collective agreements or the pay of incumbent 
workers.  The corresponding figures for Estonia and Spain imply that external labour market 
conditions are the dominant factor for a substantially larger share of firms in Estonia (32%) 
than Spain (4.4%).  In the context of our model, this would suggest that the Calvo parameter 
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for newcomers’ wages should be highest for Spain and lowest for Estonia.  Similar empirical 
information is not available for Finland.  Galuscak et al. (2010) show, however, that the 
importance of external factors in hiring pay determination is quite strongly negatively 
correlated with union density and coverage.  This implies that the wages of new employees 
should be more sensitive to external factors in Estonia than Finland.   
Since employment protection legislation (EPL) has implications for virtually all of the 
labour market characteristics considered above (worker flows, union bargaining power and 
wage rigidity, etc.), the table also reports the values of OECD EPL index for 2007.5  It follows 
that EPL is about equally strict in Estonia and Finland, but it is substantially more stringent 
in Spain.   
To conclude, Table A suggests that, generally speaking, our countries represent two types 
of labour markets.  The labour market of Estonia features relatively high employment flows, 
low union coverage and decentralised wage bargaining.  In addition, Estonia has no 
institutionalised (or otherwise widespread) wage indexation.  In contrast, the labour markets 
of Finland and Spain are characterised by high union coverage, centralised wage bargaining 
and relatively long collective contracts.  Moreover, wage indexation, implemented through 
collective agreements, is pervasive in both countries, potentially resulting in higher real wage 
rigidity.6  But, we note that Spain differs from Finland in that it has two to three times lower 
labour turnover and considerably more stringent EPL. 
 
4. CALIBRATION 
 
We use a calibrated version of our model to examine how differences between the labour 
markets in our three countries affect their response to macroeconomic shocks.  Most 
parameters are set identically for the three countries; these are shown in Table B.  
Parameters governing labour market structure, however, were set based on the results 
reported in Table A in the previous section; these parameter choices are shown in Table C. 
We set  = 0.99, which implies a real annual interest rate of 4% in steady state.  Following 
Jakab and Konya (2009), we set the relative disutility of labour supply to 0.2.  Following 
Millard (2011), we set the parameter governing the additional cost to the government of 
issuing debt to foreigners equal to 0.001.  Following the estimation results of Smets and 
                                                        
5 Babecký et al. (2010) show that downward nominal wage rigidity increases with EPL.  
6 Du Caju et al. (2008) discuss the results of cluster analysis conducted on the basis of wage 
bargaining characteristics in 23 European countries, the US and Japan. They consider three 
country groups and 2-4 finer sub-groups within them. They place both Finland and Spain in the 
second group (labour markets with regulated wage bargaining in which indexation and government 
intervention play an important role), whereas Estonia, Hungary and UK – in the third group 
(largely deregulated systems).     
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Wouters (2003) we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion in the utility function to 1.6, 
the habit persistence in consumption parameter to 0.55, the elasticity of capital adjustment 
costs to 6, the elasticity of capital utilisation costs to 0.175 and the steady-state mark up to 
1.5.  We assume that prices are reset once a year on average (ie, se set the Calvo price-setting 
parameter to 0.75) and we follow the estimation results of Smets and Wouters in setting a 
degree of inflation indexation equal to 0.43.  We also followed Smets and Wouters in setting 
which implies an annual depreciation rate of 10%, and the cost share of capital to 
0.3.  We then set the import share of non-capital costs to 0.5.  We set the ratio of government 
spending to gross output to 15%, a rough average of its value in the three economies.  We 
assume an export demand elasticity of 0.5, in line with Burgess et al. (2012).  These 
calibration choices are in Table B.  Finally, in line with the general macro literature, we set 
the AR(1) parameters of all shocks except the mark-ups of domestic and export prices to 0.9.  
The mark-up shocks are both assumed to be iid  
Table B 
  Standard parameters 
Parameter Description Value 
 Discount factor 0.99 
  Coefficient of risk aversion 1.6 
 Relative disutility of labour supply 0.2 
 Depreciation rate 0.025 
 Capital share of costs 0.3 
z Import share of non-capital costs 0.5 
h Degree of habit persistence in 
consumption 
0.55 
 Elasticity of capital adjustment costs 6 
 Elasticity of capital utilisation costs 0.175 
p Calvo parameter for price-setting 0.75 
p Degree of inflation indexation 0.43 
x Elasticity of export demand 0.5 
  Steady-state mark-up - 1 0.5 
b,f Cost of issuing debt to foreigners 0.001 
g  Share of government spending in gross 
output 
0.15 
 
Turning to the parameters governing the labour market shown in Table C, we first follow 
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and set the matching elasticity to 0.5.  For the job finding 
rate, job destruction rate and for the unemployment benefit replacement rate we used the 
results reported in Table A, above.  The implied steady-state unemployment rates are 8.5% in 
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Finland, 9.6% in Estonia and 11.1% in Spain.  The results of Table A suggest that, in all three 
countries, the wages of existing workers are reset once a year on average.  In Spain, little 
regard is given to outside labour market conditions when setting the wage of new hires 
whereas in Estonia about a third of firms said they gave regard to external labour market 
conditions.   So, we set the Calvo parameter for new hires to 0.75 (the same as existing 
employees) in Spain and Finland (which is as highly unionised as Spain) whereas we set it to 
0.5 for Estonia.  Based on Table A, we set the ‘wage indexation’ parameter to 0.5 in Estonia 
and 0.7 in Spain and Finland.  Finally, in the absence of other information we set worker 
bargaining power to 0.5 in Spain and Finland, which have high union coverage as shown in 
Table A, and to 0.2 in Estonia, which has low union coverage. 
Table C 
 Labour market parameters 
 
Parameter 
 
Description 
Value 
Estonia Finland Spain 
w Calvo parameter:  wages of 
existing employees 
0.75 0.75 0.75 
w  
Calvo parameter:  wages of new 
employees 
0.5 0.75 0.75 
w Degree of wage indexation 0.5 0.7 0.7 
 Matching elasticity 0.5 0.5 0.5 
bu Unemployment benefit 
replacement ratio 
0.52 0.71 0.55 
s  Steady-state job finding rate 0.31 0.40 0.12 
 Job destruction rate 0.033 0.037 0.015 
 Worker bargaining power 0.2 0.5 0.5 
 
5. HOW DO OUR ECONOMIES RESPOND TO SHOCKS? 
 
In this section, we consider the effects of standardised shocks on key variables in each of our 
economies.  In the following section, we try and relate differences in these effects to 
differences in the various labour markets.  We concentrate on the responses to shocks to 
domestic government spending, given the fiscal consolidation seen across the Euro Area, 
foreign demand and the domestic risk premium. 
Starting with government spending shocks, Chart 2 shows that a 1% negative government 
spending shock has a similar – and relatively small – effect in each of our economies, where 
we have characterised them based on their labour market structure.  That is, the lines are 
labelled ‘Spain’, ‘Estonia’ and ‘Finland’ not because we have a complete model of those 
economies but simply that the parameters of our model economies reflect the labour market 
features of each of them.  Given the structural features of the different labour markets alone 
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and holding everything else the same, we would expect the effect of this shock on Finnish 
output to be slightly larger than the effect on output in Spain and Estonia.  The labour market 
responses are markedly different between the three countries as shown in Charts 3 and 4.  
The government spending shock leads to a large fall in real wages and a small rise in 
unemployment in Spain and a much smaller fall in real wages and a much larger rise in 
unemployment in Finland.  This is a surprising result given what happened in reality at that 
time, as shown in Chart 1:  Finnish unemployment hardly rose at all whereas Spanish 
unemployment rose a great deal.  What is perhaps surprising is that the model suggests that 
the structural features of the Estonian labour market lead to both small falls in real wages 
and small rises in unemployment in response to the shock.  In Section 6, we investigate which 
particular features of the labour market lead to these seemingly inconsistent responses. 
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Chart 5 shows the response of output to a one percentage point rise in the domestic 
consumption risk premium, as a way of capturing the financial shock that affected the euro-
area economies we consider.  It shows that a given shock to the risk premium leads to a larger 
fall in output in an economy with the features of the Finnish labour market than in 
economies with the features of the Estonian and Spanish labour markets.  The labour market 
responses are shown in Charts 6 and 7.  The risk premium shock has a small impact on real 
wages and unemployment in the ‘Spanish’ and ‘Estonian’ labour markets but leads to a large 
rise in unemployment and a larger, though still small, fall in real wages in the ‘Finnish’ labour 
market. 
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Chart 8 shows the response of output to a one percentage point fall in world demand.  
Again a given shock to world demand leads to a larger fall in output in an economy with the 
features of the Finnish labour market than in economies with the features of the Estonian 
and Spanish labour markets.  The labour market responses are shown in Charts 9 and 10.  
Real wages fall by the most in an economy whose labour market displays ‘Spanish’ features 
and by the least in an economy displaying ‘Finnish’ features and unemployment rises by 
much more in a ‘Finnish’ labour market than in a ‘Spanish’ or ‘Estonian’ labour market. 
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These results are surprising given that Chart 1 suggests that the rise in unemployment in 
the Finnish economy was the smallest of our three economies whereas the Spanish and 
Estonian unemployment rates rose by much more.  The Estonian unemployment rate 
increased quite markedly and then fell back quickly, whereas the Spanish unemployment rate 
rose and then remained persistently high.  Our model can explain the persistence but not the 
rise.  One possible explanation is that Spain was affected by larger shocks than the other two 
economies.  In terms of the financial shock, the behaviour of bond spreads shown in Chart 11 
suggests that this was indeed the case.  It is also the case that, if we assume the job 
destruction and job finding rates in Table A are indicative of the long-run values of these 
parameters, the steady-state rate of unemployment in Spain is about 2 ½ percentage points 
higher than that in Finland so we would expect to see higher unemployment in Spain than in 
Finland, and a given percentage increase in unemloyment in Spain will translate into a larger 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate than in Finland.  Finally, it is, of course, 
quite likely that other structural features of the three economies vary;  such variations may 
explain some of the different responses though they remain outside the scope of this paper. 
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All that said, it is instructive to examine exactly which labour market features matter for 
the responses of wages and unemployment to shocks.  We consider this question in the next 
section. 
6. HOW DOES LABOUR MARKET STRUCTURE AFFECT THE RESPONSE OF 
ECONOMIES TO SHOCKS? 
 
In this section we attempt to analyse exactly which labour market features matter for the 
responses of real wages and unemployment to shocks.  In order to conserve space, we 
concentrate on the financial shock;  the effects of the other shocks are altered in similar ways.  
We use as our baseline the model as calibrated to the Spanish labour market since, in almost 
all regards, we can think of this as the least flexible labour market.  We then change each 
parameter one at a time to its most flexible value and then examine the responses of real 
wages and unemployment to our financial shock in each case. 
We start with the unemployment benefit replacement ratio, bu.  Our baseline value – 
calibrated to Spain – is 0.55.  Chart 12 shows the response of unemployment to a financial 
shock in this case and in the case of 71.0ub , the value of this parameter that we suggest fits 
the Finnish case.  As can be seen, the unemployment response is much larger, both on the 
way up and on the way down.  This goes some way to explaining the results of the previous 
section, which suggested that we might have expected a much larger response of 
unemployment in Finland to the financial shock than in Spain, conditional on the size of the 
shock.  It is clear that further work is needed to investigate why the unemployment benefit 
system in Finland does not appear to have the same effect on unemployment dynamics in the 
data as it does in the model. 
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The other key difference between the Finnish labour market and the Spanish labour 
market is the high turnover seen in Finland relative to Spain.7  Chart 13 shows the response of 
unemployment to the financial shock in the baseline case where the job finding rate, s , is set 
equal to 0.12 and in an alternative case in which we set it equal to the Finnish value of 0.4.  
As can be seen, the impact of the financial shock on unemployment is much larger in the high 
job-finding rate case than in the baseline case, but unemployment then falls quite markedly.  
This result explains the results shown in Charts 4 and 7 above, which show Finnish 
unemployment rising much more initially than Spanish or Estonian unemployment but then 
falling back quickly towards, and in fact undershooting, its lower steady-state level. 
 
                                                        
7 Recall this higher turnover is also associated with a lower steady-state rate of unemployment:  8.5% 
in Finland vs. 11.1% in Spain. 
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Now Estonia also has a much higher job finding rate than Spain.  So why is the 
unemployment response in the Estonian parameterisation of the model similar to the 
response in the Spanish parameterisation?  The answer can be seen from Charts 14 and 15.  
Chart  14 shows the response of unemployment to a financial shock in the baseline case, 
where worker bargaining power, , is set to 0.5, and in an alternative case in which we set it 
equal to the Estonian value of 0.2.  As can be seen, other things equal, lower bargaining 
power implies a much smaller response of unemployment to the shock, as firms push down 
on wages.  Chart 15 examines the effect of wage flexibility among newly-employed workers.  
In the baseline case, the parameter is set to 0.75;  in the increased flexibility case, it is set to 
the Estonian value of 0.5.  Chart 15 suggests that this increased flexibility leads to a smaller 
unemployment response relative to the baseline case, as expected, but that the difference is 
much less marked than between the high and low bargaining power cases.  Charts 13 through 
15 suggest that different facets of the Estonian labour market relative to the Spanish labour 
market work in opposite directions in terms of the unemployment response to shocks. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
To address the question of how certain labour market features shape the ways in which 
different countries have adjusted to the recent financial and word trade shocks, we calibrated 
a small open economy model using labour market data on three European economies – 
Finland, Spain, and Estonia – that differ in the extent of wage rigidity, labour turnover and 
other key labour market characteristics and examined how the responses of the model 
economy to standardised shocks depended on these labour market parameters.  The 
structural differences that we captured in our calibration included the job destruction and job 
finding rates and unemployment benefit replacement ratios. The relative rigidity of the 
Spanish labour market is reflected in its rather low job finding rate and high average 
unemployment rate whereas the Finnish and Estonian labour markets feature much higher 
job finding rates but have dramatically different income replacement ratios. Once we bring in 
our calibration of wage stickiness, as captured by the Calvo parameters for the wages of 
existing and new employees, as well as wage indexation, categorising our labour markets as 
more or less flexible becomes more difficult.  Nominal wages are fairly rigid in all our 
countries, with wages reset about once a year in all countries.  Wage indexation is high in 
Finland and Spain but in terms of the extent to which (real) wages of newly hired employees 
are related to the wages of existing employees, and the bargaining power of workers more 
generally, Estonia emerges as more ‘flexible’ than the other countries. 
We found that, given our labour market calibrations, we would expect output and 
unemployment to be much more adversely affected by the shocks associated with the 
financial crisis in Finland than in the other two countries.  In terms of real wages, on the 
other hand, we would expect Spain and Estonia to be more adversely affected.  These results 
are driven by the high unemployment benefit replacement ratio in Finland, the high job 
turnover in Finland and Estonia and the low worker bargaining power in Estonia. 
Of course, in reality the Spanish economy was much more adversely affected by the 
financial crisis than the Finnish economy.  Unemployment rose significantly in Estonia but 
quickly fell back again.  This is likely to reflect the fact that the shocks affecting these 
economies were markedly different in this period, with the effect of the financial shock on 
Spanish risk premia – as picked up in the spread of Spanish bonds over German bunds – 
being much larger than in the other countries, and necessitating a protracted period of fiscal 
consolidation that the model would pick up as a series of large negative government spending 
shocks. 
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